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sovereign governments such as the United States. Although it may be a cliché to say that outsourcing has become a central part of the way the Department of Defense (DOD) does business, it is a fact. In theory, outsourcing, as it's commonly known, allows military personnel to focus on essential competencies-what they do best-to successfully accomplish the mission.
There is a widely held belief that private commercial contractors are cheaper, provide greater flexibility, and allow the military to focus on its core missions. But in spite of the bold claims and potential benefits, there are unintended consequences. This raises questions about the longerterm impact on the department's planning, strategy and decision-making. The purpose of this paper is to examine the utility of outsourcing within DOD and in so doing use published accounts and relevant research data to provide a comprehensive historical perspective and analyze adverse impacts on: the military profession, accountability, and contingency plans.
Finally, I offer recommendations to counter some of the challenges associated with outsourcing and summarize my essential thoughts.
IS MILITARY OUTSOURCING OUT OF CONTROL?
The invasion of Iraq, if it's done nothing else, has underscored the Department of Defense's (DOD) growing reliance on commercial firms to privatize or outsource military functions. Outsourcing, it should be noted, is the practice of contracting for support from private firms while retaining responsibility for them within the organization. Privatization, on the other hand, actually involves transferring responsibility for management of a program from the organization to private contractors. Similarly, both privatization and outsourcing are viewed as ways to cut costs and increase efficiency, therefore, for the purpose of this research project, the terms will be used interchangeably.
Opponents of the department's outsourcing strategy believe the private sector is so firmly embedded in military operations that the U.S. military would struggle to wage war without it. 1 For example, private commercial firms are now being hired to do everything from cooking meals to interrogating prisoners to providing security. As a point of comparison, the ratio of private contractors to U.S. soldiers in the Gulf War was about 1 to 100 and in the current Iraqi conflict, it is 1 to 10. 2 Consider this; DOD's spending on service contracts now exceeds $100 billion annually. 3 According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, the amount of expenditures to private commercial firms is now the subject of increased debate. With respect to DOD, the political, intellectual, and financial impetus for privatization began in the 1970s and received its major political boost from the Reagan administration, which shrank government even as it increased defense expenditures by 50 percent in real terms.
Continuing with the privatization push during President Clinton's tenure, the administration adopted and capitalized on the "reinventing government" agenda spearheaded by Vice President Al Gore. It instructed the Pentagon to submit a plan for increased use of the private sector for services not central to the military's warfighting mission, and it required the DOD to provide a justification when it recommended that a function not be outsourced. 13 More recently, in February 2001, a BENS initiative, "Improving the Business End of the Military," identified activities the DOD could discontinue and replace with business models, turning entire functions like housing and logistics systems over to the private sector.
14 Advocates view the current DOD's outsourcing strategy as a catalyst for competition in the marketplace, and as a vehicle to increase efficiencies, lower costs, afford the military an opportunity to focus on its core missions, and encourage technological advances. 15 Nevertheless, the strategy poses formidable problems worth examining in areas such as:
military profession, accountability, and reliable contingency plans.
Military Profession: Negative Impacts
Obviously, the Government's beliefs that the private sector can efficiently deliver many public services have led to a prominent private sector movement, and the Defense Department is not immune to the effect of this movement. As such, in 1996, a DOD report, "Improving the Combat Edge through Outsourcing," focused on several areas for which privatization looked promising, including education and training. 16 Expanded private sector influence directly impacts the military profession primarily two ways: (1) training of military officers and (2) depleting the department of highly skilled personnel. her judgment, educating and training its own members are critical tasks for fostering professional identity and for maintaining the profession's internal control system. Outsourcing this mechanism will likely lead to less professionalism. She notes, by outsourcing the training of its own forces, DOD may be limiting its ability to define and retain its jurisdiction. As a result, the rush to outsource functions at all cost may have adversely affected leadership's ability to look at the military profession in a critical or skeptical way. 20 Avant asserts that the Army's delegation of training missions to the private sector so that it can focus on executing tasks most closely associated with ground warfare negatively influences the future shape of its profession." 21 28 Surprisingly, DOD lacks the most basic information about its contracts, and in fact doesn't know exactly how many contract workers it employs. And to find out the answer, of course it has hired more contractors. As the General Accounting Office observed, "There is only limited visibility or control at the DOD or military department level, and information systems that provide reliable data and are capable of being used as a management tool are lacking." 29 To make matters worse, the Defense Department, reduced the number of officials who oversee procurements by approximately 50 percent, and ended up hiring firms like Booz Allen Hamilton, Jefferson Solutions and the Rand Corporation to manage its contractors. Essentially, contractors were hired to manage contractors. 30 Aside from violating DOD policy, this raises relevant concerns as to whether or not private contractors have the legal authority to oversee traditional governmental functions.
In some cases DOD doesn't know how much it's spending on service contracting, let alone if billions of dollars are being spent wisely. Perhaps pointing to the very core of the accountability issue, in a report on A-76, GAO noted that entries in the Commercial Activities Management Information system (CAMIS), the contract monitoring system, are not being modified and are being used continuously without updating the data to reflect changes in or even termination of contracts. Although fiscal responsibility plays a dominant role in outsourcing decisions, DOD officials noted that they could not determine from the CAMIS data if savings were actually being realized from A-76 competitions. 31 In the final analysis, poor data perpetuates inadequate management and accountability.
GAO echoed this sentiment in a 2003 report: "Its work and the work of DOD's IG, has found that spending on services is not being managed effectively." All too often, the scenario is the same; requirements are not clearly defined, alternatives are not fully considered, vigorous price analyses are not performed, and contractors are not adequately overseen. GAO has said that DOD must do a better job of integrating contractors into planning and execution during peacetime as well as contingency operations. Until such integration and planning can be achieved, however, military commanders should be cautious about their willingness to rely on support services that directly affect their ability to operate during a contingency. 38 Indeed, if DOD could rely on private contractors 100 percent of the time, there would be little reason for concern. The U.S. military would presumably be well-positioned for the challenges that might arise. However, that strategy could prove to be highly risky and unreliable. Aside from being potentially unavailable when needed, there is always a risk of private contractors selling advanced technologies to potential adversaries. As the acquisition system places increased emphasis on "dual-use" technologies with both military and commercial applications, it is inevitable that foreign nations will gain greater access to advanced military capabilities. 39 
Recommendations
The forces that drove the growth of the private military industry seem firmly set in place. 40 Like it or not, that's the reality. Despite the challenges, I am still optimistic that DOD can derive many benefits from outsourcing. Viewed against the backdrop of historical research data;
however, I think it is necessary for the Department of Defense to reexamine its overall outsourcing strategy. As such, it is my recommendation that DOD do the following: (1) conduct an independent program assessment, (2) revise policy guidance based on the results, and (3) provide necessary resources to improve overall contract management.
The Department of Defense should undertake a comprehensive survey to discern the full scope of what it has outsourced and what the results have been. Oddly enough, this will entail hiring more contractors. The assessment will afford the department an opportunity to take an unemotional step back and examine the overall trend objectively, rather than continue to assume the outsourcing strategy is working as intended. The department must dispel the notion that just because it can turn a function over to the private sector does not mean it should. As Sobel and Thompson point out, two basic questions must be asked regarding military readiness before handing over any public function: Is the function being privatized in symmetry with national security and the public interest? If so, how will this privatization save money and promote efficiency? 41 There will obviously be risks and tradeoffs. DOD must avoid the trap of assuming that contractors will allow us to save money, limit investment, and meet the war time surge when required. 42 The fact that contracting decisions are not always driven by doctrinal or operational Pending a comprehensive independent assessment, DOD will be in a better position to clarify policy guidance. At the center of the issue is determining an agency-wide uniform definition of "core and inherently governmental functions." I can't stress enough the importance of this matter because it is the very foundation of what's best suited to be outsourced or privatized. In the past, while use of the term "core" is associated with the private sector, DOD has sometimes used the term to designate military and civilian essential positions required for military and national security reasons. Regardless of usage, determinations of core and inherently governmental functions within DOD have often been viewed as somewhat subjective in nature. 43 To add to the confusion, the term "core functions" has gained increased and more expanded use within DOD, beginning with the DOD's publication of its 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report, which recommended the identification of core and non-core functions.
According to the report, "only those functions that can be performed by DOD should be kept by DOD. Any functions that can be provided by the private sector are not a core government function." The test to separate core and non-core functions would be to determine whether a function is directly necessary for warfighting, according to the report.
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There is currently no uniform process to effectively identify future outsourcing requirements within DOD. Although the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process plays a significant role in acquisition management, outsourcing requirements are not fully captured and subsequently evaluated for effectiveness. Therefore, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the department to objectively determine the benefits of outsourcing. Of course this undermines the overall intent of PPBE, which is to generate better resource allocation decisions and provide the Combatant Commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within established fiscal constraints. 45 Inevitably, DOD has to find a way to plan and program outsourcing dollars into its formal budgeting process. Otherwise, senior leaders will continue to react by reprogramming current year operational dollars to fund urgent contractual requirements.
In order for the acquisition professionals to promptly and accurately describe what the DOD wants to buy, identify and select quality suppliers, ensure fair prices, and effectively manage and evaluate contractor performance, dramatic recapitalization is required. DOD has severely reduced the contracting workforce, rendering it unprepared to exercise basic oversight responsibilities. While contracting dollars have increased significantly, there's been no corresponding growth in the contracting workforce. During contingency operations, commanders are routinely forced to rely on poorly trained or ill prepared personnel to oversee contract performance. Ultimately, a well-functioning procurement network will depend on developing a larger cadre of skilled government personnel and capable shared supporting information systems.
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The Defense Department, along with other governmental agencies, keeps precise count of the numbers of those employed as officials-civil servants, political appointees, servicemen and woman. Yet DOD lacks the most basic information on its contract workforce. In 2002, the Secretary of the Army declared that the Army lacked "visibility" over its service contract workforce, and called for its collection. GAO also observed that departmental level limited visibility and unreliable information systems rendered management tools inadequate. 47 Specifically, the Commercial Activities Management Information system (CAMIS) has to be upgraded or replaced. It simply does not get the job done. 48 I subscribe to the old adage "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." As such, additional contracting officers, auditors, inspectors general, fiscal lawyers, military comptrollers, and administrative personnel are needed to improve the procurement system. Undoubtedly, savings in terms of wasteful spending and inefficiency would be well worth the investment in upgrading systems and increasing the number of highly skilled personnel. Perhaps establishing a DOD standard contracting officer/contract ratio would ensure proper balance and span of control. As the Services focus on combined operations, procedures and standardizing equipment becomes increasingly more important. With respect to contract management, the process of gathering, processing, analyzing, and ultimately disseminating information has to improve. It is imperative that a system be designed for the entire DOD procurement community that is capable of providing all stakeholders' access to information. Conceptually, this procurement system would be part of a larger information network shared throughout DOD as well as with other governmental organizations such as OMB.
Conclusion
In conclusion, privatization and outsourcing always comes with both positive and negative externalities. The onus is not on the private sector, but on the client, in this case the Department of Defense, to guard its own interests to ensure success. To that end, DOD will need to refine systems, processes, and procedures in order to maximize the positives and minimize the negatives. It should come as no surprise that the goal of corporate contractors is to make a profit. Governmental agencies have no financial incentive to cut corners or misrepresent results. Contractors do. 49 Without question, outsourcing adds to the multiple layers of agents with divided loyalties, between the mission of the agency and profits for the contractor. As such, sometimes outsourcing weakens accountability, but one way to mitigate it is to legally mandate that all unclassified government contracts be made available to the public on request. Equally important, each contract should also include a visibility clause requiring contractors to list the number of employees involved and what they are to be paid, thus limiting the possibility of financial abuse.
It's a given that costs will continue to be a key component in the outsourcing equation.
Having said that, the cost savings argument for outsourcing is not nearly as compelling as the potential improvement from quality of service or the flexibility afforded commanders. This does not suggest, however, that DOD personnel should not always seek the best value at the lowest possible cost. In fact, they have a responsibility to do so. Competition is essential because private contractors are profit-seeking firms whose first loyalties are to their shareholders. In other words, it's competition, not privatization or outsourcing per se, that will produce cost savings, performance improvements, and efficiencies.
Also, there is no doubt that private contractors increase the logistical and combat capabilities. Clearly, there still remain questions as to whether commanders, when conducting contingency operations, are adequately prepared to assume essential logistic related responsibilities in the event contracted support is curtailed or terminated for whatever reason.
Just as disturbing, are DOD's overall contract management deficiencies.
It should be noted that DOD is in the process of implementing the National Security
Personnel System (NSPS) as an alternative way to accelerate the department's efforts to create a total force (military, personnel, civilian personnel, and contractors). NSPS will replace the current DOD civilian personnel system of pay-for-longevity with one that pay-for-results and hold leaders accountable for managing performance. Similar to outsourcing and privatization, NSPS' intent is to save money and free up additional military positions to focus on other core missions. 50 Thus, NSPS should be viewed as complimentary to DOD's overall outsourcing strategy.
A valuable lesson here is self-evident but has often been ignored: outsource a function only if it will save money or improve efficiency. Unfortunately, all too often, we tend to outsource first and never bother to follow up later. Senior DOD officials must resist the temptation to conclude private commercial firms always do it better, quicker, and cheaper. 51 Success is likely if DOD is able to provide sufficient oversight and management of its contracts, and if the private contractor is properly motivated by the fear of being fired. Yes, the military has been
